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THE CRIMINAL SUSPECT'S ILLUSORY RIGHT
OF SILENCE IN THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH
H. J. Glasbeekt and D. D. Prentice$
As an underpinning for the decision in Miranda v. Arizona,1 the
majority of the United States Supreme Court invoked the English prac-
tice with respect to in-custody interrogation to substantiate the thesis
that "[e]xperience in some other countries also suggests that the danger
to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation is overplayed." 2 On the
other hand, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion rejected the posi-
tion that English and Commonwealth 3 practices justified the limits that
the Supreme Court eventually placed on police interrogation. 4 Deter-
mining which opinion was on sounder ground provides intricate but
enlightening material for a comparative investigation of criminal law
systems.
Any comparison between United States and Commonwealth atti-
tudes, of course, must be viewed in the light of differing legal frame-
works and social environments. The Bill of Rights, as an integral part
of the United States Constitution, has no counterpart in the countries
under survey. Further, the rights of the accused in the Commonwealth
are seldom regulated by any comprehensive body of legislation; the
topic has been subsumed by the law pertaining to crimes and evidence.5
The differences in social environment are also relevant. There is a
feeling in the United States that the crime rate is rising.6 The courts
fear that the police, operating under increased community pressures,
will tend to view the rights of the accused as obstructions to the legiti-
mate execution of their duties. Also, the findings of the Wickersham
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario. B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1963,
University of Melbourne; J.D. 1966, University of Chicago.
$ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario. LL.B. 1963, Queen's
University of Belfast; J.J. 1964, University of Chicago.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Id. at 486.
3 Hereinafter referred to as the Commonwealth countries. Unless otherwise indicated
this will include only England, Canada, and Australia.
4 384 U.S. at 522-23 (dissenting opinion).
5 In Canada, a Bill of Rights has been enacted. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 44 (Can. 1960). As
will be seen below, however, it is merely declaratory in effect. For the experience in
Commonwealth countries other than those under discussion, see de Smith, Fundamental
Rights in the New Commonwealth, 10 INTL' & Comr. L.Q. 83, 215 (1961).
8 See, e.g., Hoover, Law Enforcement States Its Views, 12 Vamr. L. REv. 457, 458 (1967);
U.S. Crime: A "Renaissance"?, NEwswEm, Feb. 27, 1967, at 31.
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Commission7 on law enforcement appear to have left an indelible im-
print on the collective judicial mind. The majority in Miranda will-
ingly accepted as prevailing police interrogation practices advice given
in police manuals, which consisted of writings by "professors and some
police officers," not one of which was "shown by the record. . . to be
the official manual of any police department... ."8 These factors have
led American courts to play an activist role in the control of the police.
In the Commonwealth countries there is no equivalent feeling of
urgency, and the courts have been correspondingly more passive. This
is explicable not so much on the ground that there is a lesser incidence
of crime-a statistic very difficult to obtain-but rather on the ground
that there is a feeling among lawyers, be it warranted or not, that these
are "fundamentally law abiding countr[ies]."9 Also, the police in the
Commonwealth countries are held in higher esteem by both the judi-
ciary and the public. In 1962 the Royal Commission on the Police
stated:
The findings of the survey constitute an overwhelming vote of con-
fidence in the police, and a striking indication of the good sense
and discrimination of the bulk of the population in their assess-
ment of the tasks that policemen have to carry out. It is clear that
such change as there has been in public opinion in recent years has
been mainly in favour of the police. We therefore assert confi-
dently, on the basis of this survey, that relations between the police
and the public are on the whole very good, and we have no reason
to suppose that they have ever, in recent times, been otherwise.' 0
Keeping the above distinctions in mind, the central problem is the
same in the United States and the Commonwealth countries: determin-
ing the degree to which the accused should be made a witting or unwit-
ting instrument in his own condemnation. Specifically, the issue is to
what extent the police may exploit the timidity, ignorance, lack of fore-
sight, and stupidity of the suspect in order to obtain a conviction.
I
TnH RIGHT To REMAIN SILENT
Theoretically, the police in the Commonwealth countries are not
legally entitled to compel a suspected person to aid them in their inves-
7 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT OF LAWvLES.-
NESS nw LAw ENFORCEMENT (1931). -
8 384 U.S. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting).
9 P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 134 (1958). The author also cites
statistics to show that the incidence of serious crimes is larger in the United States than
in England. At least one important American law officer does not view the American
populace as "fundamentally law abiding." See Hoover, supra note 6, at 466.
10 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE POLICE, CMND. No. 1728, 338 (1962).
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tigation. The fastidiousness of the courts in protecting this right is well
illustrated by the recent decision in Rice v. Connolly.1 The appellant
was thought to be acting suspiciously in an area that had been the scene
of a number of breaking-and-enterings that night. Upon request, he
refused to identify himself or give his address to a police officer unless
he were formally arrested. The police officer obliged by charging him,
under a section of the Police Act, with obstructing a police officer in
the execution of his duty; the defendant successfully appealed the ensu-
ing conviction. Lord Parker was of the opinion that the sole issue
presented by the case was whether the appellant had a lawful excuse
for refusing to answer the police constable.
It seems to me quite dear that though every citizen has a moral
duty or, if you like, a social duty to assist the police, there is no le-
gal duty to that effect, and indeed the whole basis of the common
law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put
to him by persons in authority, and to refuse to accompany those in
authority to any particular place; short, of course, of arrest.12
Clearly, if suspected persons regularly invoked the right to remain
silent, effective law enforcement would be stymied. But there is, in fact,
no likelihood that this will happen. For the most part people are igno-
rant of their right of silence; even if they were not, there is strong pres-
sure on them to cooperate, since it is popularly assumed that only the
guilty would decline to do so. Indeed, the Judges' Rules 3 recognize this
social responsibility of citizens "to help a police officer to discover and
apprehend offenders."'14 Also, the legal system does not preclude the use
of evidence obtained as a result of the suspect's voluntarily foregoing
11 [1966] 3 W.L.R. 17, [1966] 2 All E.R. 649 (Q.B.).
12 Id. at 21, [1966] 2 All E.R. at 652. See also Greathead v. Village of Newcastle,
[1954] Ont. W.N. 160 (High Ct. J.); Koechlin v. Waugh, 11 D.L.R.2d 447 (Ont. CA. 1958);
Regina v. Hoare, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 763, [1966] 2 All E.R. 846 (C.C.A.). There are a number
of minor statutory exceptions to the above principle. For these, see Martin, Canada, at 37,
and Williams, England, at 41, in PoLIcE Powa AD iNDrmuAL FpxEDOm (C.R. Sowle ed.
1962). Since our main concern is pretrial procedure, this article will not deal with the
rules relating to presumptions, comment on failure of accused to testify, burden of proof,
or adoptive admissions, although they certainly affect the quality of the accused's right
of silence.
13 The text of the first revised edition of these rules, effective since 1964, can be
found in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237. The Judges' Rules have been recognized as general guiding
principles in Canada. Regina v. Fitton, 6 D.L.R.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Typical of the
position in Australia is the province of Victoria, where the general format of the Judges'
Rules have been adopted in the Standing Orders of the Victoria Police Department. For
a copy of the Orders, see Dunn, Interrogation of Suspects.in Victoria, 40 L. INST. J. 492,
493 (1966).
14 Appendix A, (a), quoted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237 n.2.
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his right to remain silent. The position is succinctly stated by Lord
Devlin:
[W]hile the English system undoubtedly does give the accused man
the right to be silent, it does nothing to urge him to take advantage
of his right or even to make that course invariably the attractive
one. The balance on which the English system works is that it com-
bines the suspect's right to silence with the opportunity to speak.' 5
Thus, the right to remain silent does not in any meaningful way regu-
late the relationship between suspected persons and the police.
II
THE ScoPE OF LEGITIMATE QUESTIONING-THE CAUTION
If a suspect decides not to insist on his right to remain silent, are
there any limitations on the extent to which the police may exploit his
willingness to cooperate? Because of conflicting judicial opinions, the
police in 1912 requested the judiciary to articulate a policy for regulat-
ing the obtaining of evidence by police questioning. This resulted in
the Judges' Rules, 16 which have been amended several times, most re-
cently in 1964. The Rules recognize that questioning is a valuable and
legitimate part of the investigatory process. Apparently, however, the
scope of the right to question will vary directly with the stage reached
in the inquiry. Unfortunately, such variations in the permissible ambit
of questioning are closely related to the law of arrest.
Rule 1 concedes that the police should be unhampered during that
stage of the investigation in which the object of the inquiry is to ascer-
tain the guilty party.17 It also seems to permit questioning of a suspect
in custody even though he has not been arrested.' This appears to be a
major departure from the common law principle that a person cannot
15 P. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 59-60.
16 See note 13 supra. One view asserts that the Judges' Rules are designed not to
regulate police conduct, but merely to control the admissibility of evidence obtained as
a result of police questioning. See Smith, Questioning by the Police: Some Further Points
-I, 1960 CRim. L. REv. (Eng.) 347. For a brief description of the origin of the Rules, see
St. Johnston, The Legal Limitation of the Interrogation of Suspects and Prisoners in
England and Wales, 39 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 89 (1948-49).
17 1. When a police officer is trying to discover whether, or by whom, an offence
has been committed he is entitled to question any person, whether suspected or
not, from whom he thinks that useful information may be obtained. This is so
whether or not the person in question has been taken into custody so long as he
has not been charged with the offence or informed that he may be prosecuted for
it.
119 64] 1 All E.R. 237 (emphasis added).
1S Id.
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be restrained unless arrested. 9 But since this principle is clearly recog-
nized in Appendix A of the Judges' Rules themselves, 20 it is difficult to
imagine that Rule 1 was intended to override it. There are a number of
less-than-perfect resolutions of this problem. The first of these is that,
since "Rule 1 has contradicted a major principle of the law of arrest,"
it will be nugatory insofar as the two conflict.21 This thesis has been
challenged on the ground that there is a "significant difference be-
tween having a reasonable suspicion and having sufficient admissible
evidence to set the machinery of the courts in motion by preferring a
charge.'22 In other words, the phrase "taken into cusody" as used in
Rule 1 is a synonym for arrest, and therefore Rule 1 does not permit de-
tention for questioning without the filing of a formal charge. The diffi-
culty with this latter interpretation is that it berefts Rules 2 and 323 of
any meaning or function, for they appear to have been inserted specifi-
cally to cover the situation of questioning after arrest and prior to a for-
mal charge.
A more reasonable interpretation than either of the above is that
19 See Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 17, [1966] 2 All E.R. 649 (Q.B.).
20 Paragraph (b), quoted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237 n.2.
21 Brownlie, Police Powers-IV, Questioning: A General View, 1967 Cm-L L. Rxv.
(Eng.) 75, 81.
22 Thompson, Questioning: A Comment, 1967 CraM. L. Ray. (Eng.) 94, 97.
23 2. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable
grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution
that person or cause him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions, or
further questions, relating to that offence.
3. (a) Where a person is charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted
for an offence he shall be cautioned in the following terms:
"Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say anything unless
you wish to do so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing
and may be given in evidence."
(b) It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence should
be put to the accused person after he has been charged or informed that he may
be prosecuted. Such questions may be put where they are necessary for the pur-
pose of preventing or minimising harm or loss to some other person or to the pub-
lic or for clearing up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement.
Before any such questions are put the accused should be cautioned in these
terms:
"I wish to put some questions to you about the offence with which you
have been charged (or about the offence for which you may be prose-
cuted). You are not obliged to answer any of these questions, but if you
do the questions and answers will be taken down in writing and may be
given in evidence."
Any questions put and answers given relating to the offence must be contem-
poraneously recorded in full and the record signed by that person or if he refuses
by the interrogating officer.
(c) When such a person is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a
record shall be kept of the time and place at which any questioning or statement
began and ended and of the persons present.
[1964] 1 All E.R. 237-38.
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the second sentence in Rule 1 recognizes, as does the first, that the po-
lice must have wide questioning powers during the early stages of a
criminal investigation. This means that the phrase "taken into custody"
covers the situation in which the suspect comes to the police station
without overt pressure being applied by the police and the police do
not possess reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has committed an
offense. Although this is a somewhat strained reading of the actual
phraseology, it has the advantages of giving Rule 1 an independent
meaning, of being within the spirit of the Rules, and of not infringing
any common law principles. If this interpretation is correct, the Rules
apparently classify in-custody questioning, when the suspect has gone to
the police station of his own accord, as falling within the investigatory
and not the accusatorial stage of the interrogation.
24
The accusatorial stage commences when Rule 2 becomes operative
-"as soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an of-
fence" 25 -and a caution must then be given in the terms laid down in
Rule 3. Whether or not the police officer has "reasonable grounds" will
be determined objectively.2 6 This test seems similar to that applied to
ascertain whether or not a police officer possesses sufficient evidence to
make a lawful arrest without a warrant. 27 If this be so, the further re-
quirement for a lawful arrest without warrant-that the arrestee be
promptly informed of the suspected offense-gives no additional pro-
tection to that afforded by the caution in Rule 2. The major distinction
between the two forms of protection is that the police can indefinitely
delay an arrest and thus the warning of th6 suspect, whereas Rule 2 be-
comes automatically operative when the police officer has "reasonable
suspicion."
The Commonwealth countries have placed their faith in a caution
as the protective device for the suspected person once the accusatorial
process begins. But the protection provided by the caution is inade-
quate, since it comes too late in the investigation. The point at which
the caution is given is determined by the quantum of evidence pos-
24 For this distinction, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). A similar dis-
tinction is made by P. DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 31.
25 For test of Rule 2, see note 24 supra.
26 McArdle v. Egan, 150 L.T.R. (n.s.) 412, 413 (C.A. 1933); G. ABRAHAMS, POLICE QuEs-
TIONING AND THE JUDGEs' RU .Es 44-47 (1964).
27 See Criminal Law Act c. 58, § 2 <1967); John Lewis & Co. v. Tims, [1952] 1 A.C.
676, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1203; Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] 1 A.C. 573, [1947] 1 All E.R. 567.
For a different interpretation of the meaning of "reasonable grounds," see Brownlie, supra
note 21, at 83.
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sessed by the police, and not by how long questioning may have taken
place in "the compelling atmosphere of... in-custody interrogation.128
Such questioning will frequently take place when a person, upon re-
quest, accompanies a police officer to the police station. It is rather in-
genuous to maintain that, provided a suspect is not commanded to
come, he is not being detained illegally for questioning, but is willingly
cooperating. The public-spiritedness of the average citizen, the desire
of both the innocent and the guilty to convince the police of their inno-
cence, and the ignorance of the average citizen "that the police have no
compulsive power" 29 conspire to cause an individual to place himself
in a position where a caution is vital.
A classic example is Regina v. Joyce,30 where at 11:30 P.M. the po-
lice arrived at the home of the accused, who had already retired for the
night. The police invited him to accompany them to the police station,
one of the officers stating, "I need to take a statement from you." The
accused denied his guilt of any offense, and declared his reluctance to
accompany the police. He complied with the request, however, believ-
ing himself obligated to do so. At the police station he purportedly con-
fessed. The court held that the officer's misunderstood "invitation" to
go to the police station was not such an inducement as to render the
confession inadmissible.
The facts in Joyce surely must occur regularly.31 A Scots judge, un-
like his brethren in the Commonwealth countries, has dearly recog-
nized the inherently oppressive nature of in-custody questioning of the
"voluntary" variety. In Chalmers v. H. M. Advocate,32 Lord Justice
General Cooper stated:
But when a person is brought by police officers in a police van to a
police station, and while there alone, is faced with police officers of
high rank, I cannot think that his need for protection is any less
than it would have been if he had been formally apprehended.83
If the caution is to perform the function of forewarning the suspect of
28 Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 486, 465 (1966).
29 H. STREET, FREDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND Tim LAW 19-20 (1968).
30 [1958] 1 W.L.R. 140, [1957] 8 All E.R. 623 (Cent. Crim. Ct.).
31 The existence of the practice of detaining for questioning has been documented,
although the actual extent of its use is uncertain. Professor Glanville Williams states, "if
the reader will be satisfied with unqualified assertions and isolated examples, they can be
supplied." Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations, 1960 CReis.
L. REv. (Eng.) 325, 328. See also STEar, supra note 29, at 18-20.
32 [1954] Scots L.T.R. 177. Of course, as will be seen below, the oppressiveness of the
questioning may activate the voluntariness test. See Rex v. Cansdale, 12 Can. Crim. 245
(Alta. Sup. Ct. 1951).
38 [1954] Scots L.T.R. at 182-83. -
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his peril, then it should be administered when the questioning com-
mences and not held back until the police have "reasonable grounds"
to suspect the person being questioned. Criticism of the Rules, as pres-
ently formulated, is not to be taken as a recommendation for the com-
plete elimination of police questioning. Questioning by the police,
however, should take place only when the person questioned knows
about both his right of silence and the seriousness of the matter. This
could be achieved without any major modification in the present proce-
dure merely by adopting the recommendations made in 1929 by the
Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure.34 The Commission
stated:
Our precise recommendation, therefore, is that, at the outset of any
formal questioning, whether of a potential witness or of a suspected
person, with regard to any crime or any circumstances connected
therewith, a constable should first caution that person in the follow-
ing words:
"I am a police officer. I am making inquiries (into so-and-
so), and I want to know anything that you can tell me
about it. It is a serious matter, and I must warn you to be
careful what you say."
In framing this caution, we have deliberately avoided the use of
any technical phrases, and have made use of the simplest possible
words which we think will be readily understood by all persons
with whom the Police come into contact. This is a point to which
we attach great importance3 5
Even if Rule 2 has become operative and a caution has been ad-
ministered, the police are not precluded from further questioning, pro-
vided that a record of the circumstances of the questioning is kept by
the police.36 Thus, the suspect may still find himself compelled to co-
operate with the police, since a caution advising him of his right to re-
main silent loses much of its authority when immediately followed by
persistent questioning. This likely negation of the beneficial effect of
the caution was summed up by an Irish judge:
When a constable cautions his prisoner that he is not bound to
say anything to criminate himself, but that what he shall say may
be used in evidence against him on his trial, then, if the constable
says nothing for the purpose of eliciting a disclosure, the prisoner is
left to the voluntary agency of his own mind. But if the constable
34 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE, CMD. No.
3297 (1929).
35 Id. 73.
36 See Rule 2, supra note 23. For details of how the record is to be kept, see Appendix
B of the Judges' Rules, quoted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 239 n.3.
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puts a series of searching interrogatories, he virtually, and, I think,
actually and in effect, abandons the caution, and announces, by the
very course of interrogation which he applies, that it is better for
the prisoner to answer than to be silent. The process of questioning
impresses, on the greater part of mankind, the belief that silence
will be taken as an assent to what the questions imply. The very ne-
cessity which that impression suggests, of answering the question in
some way, deprives the prisoner of his free agency; and impells him
to answer, from the fear of the consequences of declining to do so.37
Further, the caution under Rule 2 does not mention that the suspect
may, at his own behest, terminate the interview, although this right is
implicit in the right to remain silent.
The right of the police to question the suspect after giving a cau-
tion under Rule 2 is not, however, completely unlimited. First, the po-
lice have no authority to demand answers; but as has been pointed out,
only an iron-willed person will invoke his right of silence in the intimi-
dating surroundings of a police station. Second, the continued ques-
tioning after caution may well render any ensuing statements involun-
tary.3 8 For example, in Rex v. Howlett,39 a statement by the accused was
excluded as involuntary, because it had been obtained through persis-
tent questioning for two hours after the caution.40 Third, the various
jurisdictions have legislation requiring prompt arraignment within
periods varying from "as soon as practicable" 41 to twenty-four hours. 42
Unfortunately for the suspect, there is no rule equivalent to the
McNabb-Mallory rule,43 which precludes the admission of evidence
obtained when the suspect is not charged as promptly as possible. Even
if the police do comply with the prompt arraignment statutes, the
permitted delay between arrest and charge may tend to intimidate the
suspect, since he has no way of knowing the limitations placed on the
police.
Fourth, all meaningful questioning must come to an end when
37 The Queen v. Johnston, 15 Ir. C.L.R. 60, 122 (1864) (Pigot, C.B., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original).
88 See note 31 supra.
39 96 Can. Crim. Cas. 182 (Ont. CA. 1950).
40 Cf. Regina v. Nye, 122 Can. Grim. Cas. 1 (Ont. CA. 1958) (in which the accused was
convicted on the basis of statements elicited after 12 hours of questioning.).
41 The Magistrates' Court Act 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 38(4); Com-
ment, Rex v. Morgan, 1961 CuR. L. Rxv. (Eng.) 588; Judges' Rules, Appendix A, (d),
quoted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237 n.2.
42 CuM. CODE CAN. § 438(2) (Snow 1955).
43 See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and
Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958).
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Rule 3 becomes operative.4 But this Rule is a weak means of protecting
the accused's right to remain silent. Since its operation can be delayed
indefinitely by the police, the caution under the Rule amounts to "lit-
tle more than a part of the formality of making the charge."45 This
flows from the decision in Regina v. Brackenbury,46 in which it was held
that "charged with the offence" meant "what every police officer would
understand it to mean, that is, formally charged with the offence." 41 It
has also been held that the phrase "informed that he may be prosecu-
ted" is intended to cover only the situation "where the suspect has not
been arrested, and where, in the course of questioning, a time comes
when the police contemplate a summons may be issued." 48 This invites
the police to delay formally charging the suspect until so much evidence
has been obtained that the safeguard purportedly provided by Rule 3 is
rendered meaningless.
These defects are compounded by the fact that the Judges' Rules
are not rules of law, but merely
rules of practice drawn up for the guidance of police officers; and if
a statement has been made in circumstances not in accordance with
the Rules, in law that statement is not made inadmissible if it is a
voluntary statement, although in its discretion the court can always
refuse to admit it if the court thinks that there has been a breach of
the Rules.49
Where a violation of the Rules has led to exclusion, it has been based
on police conduct that was dearly overbearing and likely to cause a
problem relating to voluntariness50 Since 1964, the Court of Criminal
Appeal has been empowered to order a new trial,"' and perhaps the
courts will now adopt a more stringent attitude toward violation of the
Rules. Until 1965, the only possible alternatives open to an appellate
court were to quash or uphold the conviction. Nevertheless, as long as
enforcement of the Rules lies within the discretion of the trial judge,
the ability of the Court of Appeal to exercise firm powers of control
44 See text of Rule 2, quoted in note 23 supra.
45 Brownlie, sura note 21, at 84.
46 49 Grim. App. 189, [1965] 1 All E.R. 960.
47 Id. at 190, [1965] 1 All E.R. at 961 (emphasis in original).
48 Regina v. Collier, [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1470, 1473, [1965] 3 All E.R. 136, 138 (C.C.A.).
49 Rex v. May, 36 Crim. App. 91, 93 (1952).
50 See Rex v. Brown, 23 Grim. App. 56 (1931); Rex v. Taylor, 17 Grim. App. 109
(1922); Rex v. Grayson, 16 Grim. App. 7 (1921). But see Regina v. Smith, 46 Grim. App.
51 (1962); Rex v. Wattam, 36 Grim. App. 72 (1952); Rex v. Turner, 19 Grim. App. 171
(1925); Rex v. Booker, 18 Grim. App. 47 (1924); The King v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531
(C.C.A.); The King v. Best, [1909] 1 K.B. 692 (C.C.A.); Rex v. Crowe, 81 J.P. 288 (1917).
51 Criminal Appeal Act, c. 43, § 1 (1964).
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over criminal procedure is at best tenuous. The appellate courts are re-
luctant to override discretionary rulings.
The Rules, which were formulated at the request of a police force
seeking guidance concerning permissible questioning techniques, ap-
parently have not been used by the courts to regulate the exercise of
their own discretion to exclude. Inevitably this creates uncertainty
among the police concerning the extent of their powers, tempting them,
whenever a suspect's guilt seems likely, to gamble that a violation of the
Rules will not harm the chances of a conviction.52 In England a coun-
tering influence is at work: the special relationship between the police,
the prosecution, and the judiciary. Under this system, the police, like
private citizens, hire barristers, as opposed to having a permanent pros-
ecuting attorney.53 The barrister in turn is tightly controlled by the ju-
diciary's sentiments, and in the words of Lord Devlin, "[w]hat the
judge disapproves of, the Bar is unlikely to do; and if the Bar will not
do it, the police must conform."' 5 4 Thus, the efficient operation of the
Rules ultimately depends on the good will of specific law officers. At
best this is a precarious safeguard for the suspect.
III
THE RiG-rr TO COUNSEL
The central feature of the Rules is that they rely heavily on the
caution as a technique for protecting the suspect's right to remain si-
lent. Another available device is the provision of a right to counsel at
an early stage in the proceedings. This right is accorded in a qualified
form by the Judges' Rules, which provide:
[E]very person at any stage of an investigation should be able to
communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so
even if he is in custody provided that in such a case no unreason-
able delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation
or the administration of justice by his doing so . . .55
The Rules also provide that "persons in custody should.., be informed
orally of the rights and facilities available to them." 56
52 Of course, if the suspect pleads guilty after the Rules have been violated, the
violation will never come to the notice of the court.
53 In the larger metropolitan areas of Australia and Canada, the Crown is represented
by state prosecutors, who are nonelected officers. See, e.g., The Crown Attorneys Act, R.S.
Ont. 1960, c. 82.
54 P. DE WN, supra note 9, at 27.
55 Judges' Rules, Appendix A, I (c), quoted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237 n.2 (emphasis
added). See also id., Appendix B, 7, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 240.
56 Id., Appendix B, 7(b), [1964] 1 All E.R. at 240.
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By permitting consultation betwen the suspect and his counsel to
be delayed by the police until it does not interfere with the "adminis-
tration of justice," the Rules deviate considerably from the procedure
laid down in Miranda. This reflects the high priority accorded effective
law enforcement in England,57 a priority, no doubt, that the critics of
Miranda would wish to see recognized in the United States. This
equivocal drafting of the Rules may explain the complete dearth of
right-to-counsel cases. Another possible explanation is the feeling that
counsel would be superfluous because there is no general fear that the
police will indulge in overbearing tactics. Thus, perhaps neither the
judge, the suspect, nor the suspect's counsel would consider it a glaring
anomaly if counsel were not present during the questioning period.
The result is that the lack of counsel is not a matter of contention. In-
deed, the most recent Royal Commission on the Police58 did not refer at
all to the right to counsel during police interrogation. The basic fact is
that English criminal procedure does not rely on the provision of coun-
sel at the investigatory stage of the proceedings. Even at trial the right
to counsel is not unqualified. Although most of the Commonwealth
countries have extensive provision for legal aid,59 denial of counsel to
an indigent at trial will not automatically result in reversal of his con-
viction.60
Whereas in Australia the extent of the right to counsel is similar to
that in England, the recent enactment of a Bill of Rights6l in Canada
provided the courts with an opportunity to create new jurisprudence in
this area. During the debates on this bill in Parliament an opposition
spokesman said, "this Bill will not add something to our legal safe-
57 See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE, Cam. No.
3297, 96 (1929); Williams, supra note 31, at 344-45.
58 OMaN. No. 1728 (1962).
59 For a review of the English and Canadian legal aid provisions, see PROVINCE OF
ONTARIO, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL Am (1965). This report resulted in
the introduction of a comprehensive scheme for legal aid in both civil and criminal
matters. The Legal Aid Act 1966, S. Ont., c. 80 (1966). For Australian practice, see, e.g.,
Legal Assistance Act, No. 17 (N.S.W. 1943), as amended, No. 63 (N.S.W. 1957); Poor
Persons Legal Assistance Act, No. 6339 (Vict. 1958).
60 Regina v. Huebschwerlen, 45 Can. Crim. 393 (Yukon CA. 1965); Regina v. Howes,
[1964] 1 W.L.R. 576, [1964] 2 All E.R. 172 (C.C.A.); Galos Hirad v. The King, [1944] A.C.
149, [1944] 2 All E.R. 50 (P.C.). Also, if an accused has been represented, then he "must
surely assume responsibility for the actions of his own solicitor," and "the mistake of the
solicitor must be regarded as the mistake of the client." Regina v. Behr, [1967] 1 Ont. 639,
646 (Thunder Bay D. Ct.).
61 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 44 (Can. 1960).
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guards which does not at present exist."'62 So far this prediction has
proven correct. The Bill of Rights provides:
[N]o law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(c) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained
(ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without
delay...
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other
authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is
denied counsel, protection against self crimination or
other constitutional safeguards .... 63
The interpretation given these provisions has been extremely restric-
tive. It has been held that they do not require the police64 or the judge65
to advise arrested persons of their right to retain counsel. In fact, in Re-
gina v. Piper,66 the court held that the right to counsel as laid down in
Gideon v. Wainwright67 and Powell v. Alabama68 could not be dupli-
cated without further legislation. The most significant decision to date
has been that of the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. O'Con-
nor.9 The accused was stopped by a police officer, who formed the
opinion that the accused was drunk and unfit to drive. The officer took
the accused to the police station, where a breathalyser test indicated
that he was under the influence of drink. The trial judge found that
the accused was not told he was to be charged and did not know he
was under arrest until after the breathalyser tests were taken. After
the tests had been administered, he made a request to contact his
lawyer. He was allowed to make one telephone call, but the solicitor
was not available. The Ontario High Court excluded the results of
the breathalyser tests for two reasons. First, and most important, the
failure by the police promptly to inform the accused of the nature of
62 104 CAN. H.C. DEB. 5728 (1960). The speaker was Mr. P. Martin, now Minister of
External Affairs.
63 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 2 (Can. 1960). See Cram. CODE CAN. §§ 557(3), 590, 709(2)
(Snow 1955), for other provisions referring to right to counsel.
64 Regina v. Gray, 132 Can. Crim. Cas. 337 (B.C. County Ct. 1962). This is contrary to
the Judges' Rules.
65 Regina v. Piper, 51 D.L.R.2d 534 (Man. C.A. 1964).
66 Id. at 535-36.
67 572 U.S. 335 (1963).
68 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
69 48 D.L.R.2d 110 (Ont. H.C. 1964), rev'd, 52 D.L.R.2d 106 (Ont. C.A. 1966), aff'd, 57
D.L.R.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1966)
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the charge against him directly affected his capacity to invoke section
2(c)(ii) of the Bill of Rights. Second, if counsel had been provided im-
mediately upon request, he might have detected some mechanical defi-
ciency in the breathalyser equipment or inaccuracy in the actual tests.
In reaching this conclusion, the judge recognized the crucial impor-
tance of counsel at this stage of the investigation:
It is the early participation of counsel both in fact development
and fact presentation which lends some semblance of reality to the
concept of the balance existing between the accused and the other-
wise irresistible forces of the State. To waylay counsel in this cru-
cial and vital stage of fact development, as the police in this
instance would seem to have desired to do, is tantamount to way-
laying the cornerstone of our concept of criminal justice so pains-
takingly assembled through almost countless generations. 0
The decision was reversed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which
in turn was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme
Court rejected the view that section 2(c)(ii) imposed any positive duty
on the police to inform the accused of his right to counsel. It rejected
the first of the High Court's reasons on the ground that it was not jus-
tified to infer that the accused would have retained counsel if promptly
informed of the charge. The second reason was considered "specula-
tive," because there was no indication that "the presence of counsel in
the police station after the tests had been completed... would have af-
fected the admissibility of this evidence."7 1 This suggests that, before
the right to counsel provisions of the Bill of Rights are violated, there
must be some indication that the presence of counsel would have bene-
fited the accused. Significantly, the Supreme Court also evinced a cer-
tain reluctance to put teeth in the right-to-counsel provisions of the Bill
of Rights. It reasoned that, even if there had been a violation of section
2(c)(ii), Section 224 of the Criminal Code72 left it with no option but to
admit the evidence. Although section 2(c)(ii) does not by its terms re-
quire exclusion of evidence obtained after its violation, giving section
224(3) its normal scope denies any real efficacy to the Bill of Rights.73 As
70 Id. at 115.
71 57 D.L.R.2d at 129.
72 In any proceedings under Section 222 or 223, the result of a chemical analysis
of a sample of the blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance of a person may
be admitted in evidence on the issue whether that person was intoxicated or under
the influence of a narcotic drug or whether his ability to drive was impaired by
alcohol or a drug, notwithstanding that he was not, before he gave the sample,
warned that he need not give the sample or that the results of the analysis of the
sample might be used in evidence.
CPaM. CODE CAN. § 224(2)(c)(ii) (Snow 1955) (emphasis added).
73 This is even more paradoxical in view of the introduction to § 2 of the Bill of
Rights, which states:
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the Ontario High Court observed, Parliament had attached the utmost
importance to the Bill of Rights and dearly "intended that its enforce-
ment should not lack for want of a remedy."74
A further example of the reluctance of the Canadian courts to use
the Bill of Rights to extend the right to counsel is provided by Regina
v. Steeves 7 Section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights provides that no law of
Canada is to be construed so as to "deprive a person of the right to a
fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice
for the determination of his rights and obligations."76 The defendant
was deliberately denied counsel prior to trial, but the court held the
section was not violated. This conduct could not be considered "fatal to
the fair hearing at the trial and it is in the light of the trial itself that
the fair hearing provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights must be ex-
amined."77
IV
ExcLuSIONARY RULES OF EVIDENCE AS A MEANS OF REGULATING
POLICE CONDUCT
The deficiencies of the caution under the Judges' Rules and of the
right to counsel have not been remedied by development of exclusion-
ary rules of evidence to regulate the conduct of the police. As a condi-
tion precedent to the admissibility of an incriminatory statement,78 the
prosecution must show that the statement is free and voluntary "in the
sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the
Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of
Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to
authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or
freedoms herein recognized and declared ....
74 Regina v. O'Connor, 48 D.L.R.2d 110, 118 (Ont. H.C. 1964). There are, of course,
remedies other than exclusion available when the Bill of Rights has been violated. For
example, the conviction could be quashed. But this remedy was precluded by the Supreme
Court in O'Connor. Alternatively, the aggrieved person might be able to lay an information
under the Canadian Criminal Code. This is highly theoretical. See W. TAUqAPOLSKY, THm
CANADIAN Bu.. OF RIGHTS 180 et seq. (1966). Third, a tort action might be maintained for
breach of statutory duty. See id.
75 42 D.L.R.2d 335 (N.S. Sup. Ct. 1964).
76 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 2(e) (Can. 1960).
77 42 D.L.R.2d at 345.
78 In England any incriminatory statement is considered a confession for the purposes
of the voluntariness test. In Regina v. Harz, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 297, 303-04, [1967] 1 All
E.R. 177, 182 (H.L.), the House of Lords declined to draw a distinction between "con-
fessions and admissions which fall short of a full confession," and thus impliedy rejected
the Wigmore thesis. See 3 J. WiGMoRE, Evmnr.cE § 821, at 238-39 (3d ed. 1940). For the
Canadian position, which is more akin to that of Wigmore, see Regina v. Black, [1966]
3 Can. Crim. Cas. (ns.) 187 (Ont. CA.).
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or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority."'"O
Inevitably, this language is difficult for the courts to apply, because the
circumstances in which the confession was made must be evaluated in
terms of their impact on the state of mind of the accused. In addition,
of course, every confession can be said to be voluntary, in that it is the
"expression of a choice, that it is willed to be made."80 On the other
hand, no confession is voluntary in the sense that it is a spontaneous act
by the confessor, except in the unique situation in which a person
walks into the police station and confesses.8 ' This latter argument was
rejected in Regina v. Fitton,82 even though it is semantically correct.
These difficulties in applying the voluntariness test could be partially
overcome if the courts had a definite view of its proper function. Unfor-
tunately, no clear declaration of purpose has been forthcoming. By an
examination of statutory modifications of the common law and the
cases, some tentative conclusions can be made concerning the ends
served by the test.
Section 149 of the Victorian Evidence Act (1958) provides:
No confession which is tendered in evidence shall be rejected on
the ground that a promise or threat has been held out to the per-
son confessing, unless the judge or other presiding officer is of
opinion that the inducement was really calculated to cause an un-
true admission of guilt to be made.
In Cornelius v. The Kings this section was construed to apply only
when a threat or promise had induced a confession. The High Court
of Australia decided that, when other kinds of tactics are used, the
voluntariness of the confession must be determined by established
common law criteria.84 Impliedly, then, there are other criteria of ad-
missibility than the trustworthiness of the obtained confession, although
it is unclear what these criteria are. Nevertheless, after holding that the
Victorian Evidence Act was inapplicable because no threat or promise
was present, the High Court in McDermott v. The King85 admitted
79 Ibrahim v. Regem, [1914] A.C. 599, 609 (P.C.).
80 Regina v. Fitton, 6 D.L.R.2d 529, 533 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
81 Examples of such strange happenings can be found in People v. Pike, 239 Cal.
App. 2d 237, 48 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966) (the police asked a suspect his name and he blurted
out a confession), and People v. Vallarta, 236 Cal. App. 2d 128, 45 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1965)
(the defendant boasted that he was the biggest narcotics pusher in the county).
82 6 D.L.R.2d 529 (Sup. 1957).
83 55 Commw. L.R. 235 (H.C. Austl. 1936).
84 McDermott v. The King, 76 Commw. L.R. 501 (H.C. Austl. 1948); The King v. Lee,
82 Commw. L.R. 133 (H.C. Austl. 1950). For an exhaustive review of these and other cases,
see Z. COWEN & P. CARTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 41 et seq. (1956).
85 76 Comniw. L.R. 501 (H.C. Austl. 1948).
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evidence obtained as a result of questioning after a charge was made,
although there had been no formal caution. Similarly, in The King v.
Lee,s8 the confession was made after improper in-custody interrogation
of the accused, and the evidence was held to be admissible.
The recent case of Regina v. Harz87 also indicates that the volun-
tariness test is designed for more purposes than merely guaranteeing
the trustworthiness of confessions. Customs officers exercised their statu-
tory power to compel the defendants to produce their books, and re-
quested them to attend an interview in order to answer questions. At
the interview, the defendants were told by the investigators that they
could be prosecuted for refusing to give information, a view that was
endorsed by defendants' counsel. The customs officers did not in fact
have the power to initiate a prosecution if suspects refused to answer
questions, but the defendants, in their ignorance, made incriminating
statements. The Court of Criminal Appeal reversed the ensuing convic-
tion. 8 The majority, while conceding that truth as a criterion for the
admissibility of incriminating statements would adequately serve the
ends of justice, held that the authorities precluded the court from de-
ciding "this-case by application of that principle."8' 9 It should be noted
that no doubt was voiced about the truth of the incriminating evidence.
A vigorous dissent contended that the confession was admissible because
it was not made in circumstances in which there was a "danger that the
accused might have been tempted to make such a statement when it was
untrue."90 The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeal, 91 and this decision has been interpreted to hold that,
"[w]hatever be the nature of the inducement.., and however trivial it
may seem to the average man to have been," it will provide a basis for
the exclusion of the incriminating statement.92
This test is dearly aimed at controlling the conduct of the police
in their investigatory activities, since the test for exclusion will be dif-
ferently framed when the inquiry has been undertaken by a person not
in authority. In the latter case the question concerns the "effect of the
inducements. Did it go so far as to deprive the person to whom it was
made of free will and choice as to whether or not he would make a state-
86 82 Commw. L.R. 183 (H.C. Austl. 1950).
87 [1967] 2 W.L.R. 297, [1967] 1 AU E.R. 177 (H.L.).
88 [1966] 8 W.L.R. 1241, [1966] 3 All E.R. 433 (G.C.A.).
89 Id. at 1271, [1966] 8 All E.R. at 456.
90 Id. at 1268, [1966] 8 All E.R. at 450.
91 [1967] 2 W.L.R. 297, [1967] 1 All E.R. 177 (H.L.).
92 Regina v. Richards, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 658, 655, [1967] 1 All E.R. 829, 830 (CA.);
see Regina v. Wilson, [1967) 2 W.L.R. 1094, [1967] 1 All. E.R. 797 (C.A.).
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ment as he did?"'9 By distinguishing between inducements held out by
persons in authority and those held out by other persons, the court ap-
pears to recognize the inherently more oppressive nature of the former
situation. For the purpose of this distinction, the phrase "person in au-
thority" includes, at the minimum, persons who can have a direct effect
on the initiation and conduct of a criminal prosecution.94 The problem
with the voluntariness test, however, is that the factual issue of induce-
ment will usually reduce itself to a swearing contest between the police
and the accused. The unsatisfactory result is that the application of
rules partly designed to control police investigation practices is depen-
dent to a great extent on police say-so.
Another severe limitation on the voluntariness test as a device to
discourage the police from violating the suspect's right of silence is
the doctrine of "confirmation by subsequent facts." 95 Although in
England the doctrine is somewhat unsettled, "facts discovered in con-
sequence of inadmissible confessions may certainly be proved in evi-
dence if their relevance can be established without resorting to any
part of the confession." 96 In Canada the law is clearer. In Rex v.
St. Lawrence,97 Chief Justice McRuer stated the law as follows:
Where the discovery of the fact confirms the confession-that
is, where the confession must be taken to be true by reason of the
discovery of the fact-then that part of the confession that is con-
firmed by the discovery of the fact is admissible, but further than
that no part of the confession is admissible.9 s
The solution in St. Lawrence is a compromise between the principle
that coerced confessions are excluded because of their unreliability and
the principle that they are excluded in order to control the police.
Logically, of course, there is no reason why the whole confession should
not be considered reliable if some part of it is confirmed by conse-
quently discovered facts.99 Clearly, this doctrine tempts the police to
indulge in coercive practices.
This ambivalence is also exemplified in the rules regulating the
conduct of the voir dire. In some of the Commonwealth jurisdictions
93 Regina v. Richards, 1967] 1 W.L.R. 653, [1967] 1 All E.R. 829 (CA.).
94 See, e.g., Regina v. Wilson, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 1094, [1967] 1 An E.R. 797 (C.A.). In
this case the victim of a robbery, who recovered the stolen property by private negotiation
with the thieves, was held to be a person in authority.
95 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 856, at 337.
96 A. CRoss, EVIDENCE 266 (3d ed. 1967). See also Z. COWEN & P. CAaTER, ESSAYS ON
TrE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1956).
97 [1949] Ont. 215.
98 Id. at 228.
99 See 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 78, § 857, at 338.
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it is permissible for prosecution counsel to ask the accused during the
voir dire whether the confession is true. In the Canadian case of Regina
v. De Clerq,00 the dissent opposed this approach on the ground that it
created a prejudicial threat to the accused, especially when the trial
judge was sitting alone, since he could never completely exclude from
his mind an affirmative answer given by the accused.10 1 The lot of the
accused is not greatly enhanced when the trier of fact is a jury, because
in most Commonwealth countries the major responsibility for deter-
mining voluntariness rests with the judge. 0 2 This is true even in
England where the Massachusetts rule, giving the jury partial respon-
sibility, has precarious tenure. 0 3
V
THE PROBLEM OF POLICE DECEPTION
Even if maximum protection is accorded to a suspect's right to
remain silent by administering a caution and providing counsel upon
request, there may be circumstances in which the police could under-
mine this right by deceptive practices. Although on several occasions
the courts have had to adjudicate the admissibility of evidence obtained
by deception, the jurisprudence is still in such a fledgling state that
only the most tentative predictions about its likely development can
be made. Usually the courts have admitted such evidence, while often
voicing their disapproval of police subterfuge.
In a recent Canadian case, Regina v. McLean,10 4 a confession was
excluded as being involuntary when it was made after the accused
was falsely informed that his accomplice had made a statement which
implicated him.10 The court distinguished Regina v. Fitton,10 6 in
which the Supreme Court of Canada admitted a confession obtained in
similar circumstances with the difference that the police were telling
the truth. If the confession was voluntary in the Fitton situation, it
100 [1966] 1 Ont. 674 (CA. 1965).
101 This doctrine has been upheld in England in Rex v. Hammond, 28 Crim. App. 84,
[1941] 3 All E.R. 318. Some of the Canadian jurisdictions have rejected it. Rex v. Weighill,
[1945] 2 D.L.R. 471 (B.C.CA.); Regina v. Hnedish, 26 W.W.R. (ns.) 685 (Sask. Q.B. 1958).
102 Regina v McAloon, [1959] Ont. 441 (CA.); Basto v. Regina, 91 Commw. L.R. 628
(H.C. AustI. 1954).
103 See Note, What Happened to the Voir Dire?, 83 L.Q. Rav. 332 (1967); MacKenna,
The Voir Dire Revisited, 1967 CaL. L. Ray. (Eng.) 336. The tenuous nature of the
English position is indicated by the attitude of the Privy Council in Chan Wei Keung v.
Reginam, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 552, [1967] 1 All E.R. 948.
104 126 Can. Crim. Cas. 395 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1957).
105 Cf. The King v. White, 15 Can. Crim. Cas. 30 (Ont. C.A. 1908).
100 6 D.L.R.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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must have been voluntary in Regina v. McLean, since the stimulus pro-
voking the confessions was identical in both cases. The obvious dis-
tinction between the cases is that in McLean the court disapproved of
the police deception and adopted the elusive concept of voluntariness
to discipline the police obliquely; but in so doing, the court overworked
the concept.
The inadequacy of the voluntariness test as a means of controlling
police deception is graphically illustrated when the deception results
in the obtaining of incriminatory real evidence. Since under Common-
wealth law admissibility of real evidence is a function of relevancy,107
the voluntariness test has no role to play, and therefore can never
provide a jurisprudential underpinning for the exclusion of real evi-
dence obtained by trick. Nevertheless, faced with real evidence decep-
tively obtained, the courts on a number of occasions have excluded it
even though relevant. For example, in Regina v. Payne,08 the Court
of Criminal Appeal concluded that the trial judge should have exer-
cised his discretion to exclude the results of a medical examination
that the accused had undergone when assured that it was merely a
routine examination and that the results would not be used in evi-
dence. In Callis v. Gunn,0 9 however, the court admitted fingerprint
evidence given by the accused even though he was not informed that
he was under no obligation to do so; but unlike Payne no assurance
was given that the evidence would not be used against him. Lord Chief
Justice Parker considered that evidence obtained by trick or false
representation should be excluded in the exercise of the trial court's
discretion. 110 In other words, the trial judge's factual evaluation of the
oppressiveness of the trick would determine admissibility.
It is axiomatic that the concept of discretion can never be given
precise metes and bounds. Normally some exactness can be provided
by repeated decisions, an exactness that is at a premium, because the
exclusion is directly aimed at controlling the police. Unfortunately,
there has been a paucity of decisions. The present jurisprudence sug-
gests that the judicial discretion to exclude will only be exercised when
the deception is egregious. In estimating the offensiveness of the de-
107 Kuruma v. Reginam, [1955] A.C. 197, [1955] 1 All E.R. 236 (P.C). .
108 [1963] 1 W.L.R. 637; [1963] 1 All E.R. .848 (C.C.A.); see Rex v. Nowell, [1948]
1 All E.R. 794 (C.CA.); Rex v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531 (C.CA.); Comment, Regina v.
Court, 1962 Ciar. L. REv. (Eng.) 697.
109 [1964] 1 Q.B. 495, [1963] 3 All E.R. 677.
110 "]f there was any suggestion of it having been obtained oppressively, by false
representation, by a trick, by threats, by bribes, anything of that sort," it should be
excluded. Id. at 502, [1963] 3 All E.R. at 681.
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ception, the courts, so far, have recognized that trickery is a valuable
and a necessary tool for efficient law enforcement. Thus, in Regina v.
Maqsud Ali,"' two suspects who voluntarily went to the police station
to aid the police in their investigation of a murder were left in a room
together in which there was a concealed microphone. They made in-
criminatory statements that were overheard by the police and were
held to be admissible.
The criminal does not act according to Queensberry Rules. The
method of the informer and of the eavesdropper is commonly used
in the detection of crime. The only difference here was that a me-
chanical device was the eavesdropper. If, in such circumstances and
at such a point in the investigations, the appellants by incautious
talk provided evidence against themselves, then in the view of this
court it would not be unfair to use it against them. The method of
taking the recording cannot affect admissibility as a matter of law
although it must remain very much a matter for the discretion of
the judge.112
The use of agents provocateurs, of course, is another deceptive
device available to the police to circumvent the accused's rights of
silence. In Brannan v. Peek,"3 Lord Chief Justice Goddard strongly dis-
approved the conduct of two officers in plain clothes who entered a
public house and prevailed upon the appellant to accept a bet from
them.
The court observes with concern and with strong disapproval that
the police authority at Derby apparently thought it right in this
case to send a police officer into a public house for the purpose of
committing an offence in that house. It cannot be too strongly em-
phasized that unless an Act of Parliament provides that for the pur-
pose of detecting offences police officers or others may be sent into
premises to commit offences therein-and I do not think any Act
does so provide-it is wholly wrong to allow a practice of that sort
to take place.114
This statement was dictum, since the gambling involved did not violate
1l [1965] 3 W.L.R. 229, [1965] 2 All E.R. 464 (C.C.A.).
112 Id. at 240, [1965] 2 All E.R. at 469. See also Regina v. Steinberg, [1967] 1 Ont. 733
(C.A.), in which the police, while conducting a legal search of the accused's premises, con-
cealed a microphone; the resulting evidence was held to be admissible. For the English
position on wiretapping, see REPORT OF THE CoMMIrrEE oF PRuvY COUNCILLORS APPOINTED
To INQUIRE INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, CMND. No. 283 (1957); for Canada,
see Chorney, Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, 7 CGum. .Q. 434 (1964-65), and
Cornfield, The Right to Privacy in Canada, 25 U. TORONTO FACULTY OF L. REv. 103 (1967);
for Australia, see Note, 2 FED. L. REV; 132 (1966).
113 [1948] 1 K.B. 68, [1947] 2 All E.R. 572.
114 Id. at 72, [1947] 2 All E.R. at 573.
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the criminal law. In Browning v. J.W.H. Watson (Rochester) Ltd., 15
however, the evidence was also obtained by agents provocateurs and
Lord Chief Justice Goddard permitted its introduction while again
castigating the use of such tactics. The most extensive discussion of the
problem to date is to be found in Regina v. Murphy."6 In this case Lord
MacDermott distinguished between two categories of agents provoca-
teurs. Some merely offer enticement "to those who are predisposed to
commit the offence in question," while others hold out an enticement
"which by its nature subjects to some particular temptation or pressure
those who may have no such predisposition." 117 Irrespective of the cate-
gory into which the conduct of the agent provocateur falls, however,
there is no guarantee that the evidence will be excluded; as a matter
of law, admissibility is a function of relevancy,118 and if the evidence
is relevant its exclusion depends on the exercise of judicial discretion
and is not subject to a rule of automatic exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The majority in Miranda was not justified in invoking Common-
wealth rules of criminal procedure in support of its holding. Although
Commonwealth practice demands "that a cautionary warning be given
an accused," the requirement that it does not have to be administered
until "a police officer.., has evidence that affords reasonable grounds
for suspicion"119 often results in situations where the accused is sub-
jected to "custodial interrogation"'120 without the benefit of a caution.
Further, while the United States Supreme Court was correct in saying
that "the right of the individual to consult with an attorney . . . is
expressly recognized"'121 under the Judges' Rules, this right is severely
qualified by the requirement that its invocation shall cause "no unrea-
sonable delay or hindrance ... to the processes of investigation or the
115 [1953] 2 All E.R. 775 (Q.B.).
116 [1965] N.I. 138. There are a number of English cases involving larceny in which an
element of entrapment was involved. See, e.g., Rex v. Turvey, [1946] 2 All E.R. 60 (CA.).
As has been pointed out by Donnelly, these cases are not strictly applicable to the problem
at hand, since they normally involve the question whether the crime has been committed.
The question here is what is to be done with the deceptively obtained evidence when all
the elements of the crime are present. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs, 60 YAL L.J. 1091 (1951).
117 [1965] N.I. at 140.
118 See page 492 supra. The Lord Chief Justice, of course, qualified this statement
with the caveat that "confessions which are not voluntary are outside this proposition and
are dearly inadmissible." [1965] N.I. at 140.
119 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 487 (1966).
120 Id. at 444.
121 Id. at 488.
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administration of justice . *... ,12 The right to counsel has, in fact,
served no meaningful function as a safeguard to the suspect in the
Commonwealth countries. Finally, under the American practice, vio-
lation of the rules governing investigation, as most recently laid down
in Miranda, will result in automatic exclusion. In the Commonwealth
countries, however, the courts supervise somewhat similar rules by an
application of judicial discretion. 1' This frequently results in the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the suspect's basic right
to remain silent.
122 Appendix A, (c), quoted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237 n.2.
123 By making the admissibility of evidence dependent on the exercise of judicial
discretion and by adopting the thesis that many of the rules of evidence are rules of
practice and not strict rules of law (see, e.g., Regina v. Cleghorn, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 1421,
[1967] 1 All E.R. 996 (C.A.)), the law of evidence in England is potentially fluid and
nebulous.
